Ideal Language Philosophy and Experiments on Intuitions

Sebastian Lutz

Abstract


Proponents of linguistic philosophy hold that all non-empirical philosophical problems can be solved by either analyzing ordinary language or developing an ideal one. I review the debates on linguistic philosophy and between ordinary and ideal language philosophy. Using arguments from these debates, I argue that the results of experimental philosophy on intuitions support linguistic philosophy. Within linguistic philosophy, these experimental results support and complement ideal language philosophy. I argue further that some of the critiques of experimental philosophy are in fact defenses of ideal language philosophy. Finally, I show how much of the current debate about experimental philosophy is anticipated in the debates about and within linguistic philosophy. Specifically, arguments by ideal language philosophers support experimental philosophy.

Keywords


experimental philosophy, explication, intuition, linguistic philosophy, ordinary language philosophy, ideal language philosophy, metaphilosophy

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/spe.2009.2.2.07

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Online ISSN: 1736-5899 | Print ISSN: 2228-110X