Believe It or Not: On Multiplying Classes of Belief-like States

James Robert Thompson

Abstract


This paper explores whether it is justified to add any new taxa concerning informational states to our psychological taxonomy. Such exploration will not lead to a straightforward decision between remaining steadfast with the taxonomic status quo and adding only one new taxon. A careful analysis of when one would be warranted in positing a new taxon for informational states will reveal similarly compelling reasons to posit all sorts of additional taxa. As an antidote to such proliferation, I suggest a reinforcement of traditional taxonomies of the mental by allowing belief and a range of extant taxa to play their requisite explanatory roles, thereby obviating the need for the postulation of any novel taxa.


Keywords


folk psychology; belief; alief

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/spe.2016.9.1.04

Copyright (c) 2017 James Robert Thompson

Online ISSN: 1736-5899 | Print ISSN: 2228-110X