Dependence and Fundamentality

Justin Zylstra

Abstract


I argue that dependence is neither necessary nor sufficient for relative fundamentality. I then introduce the notion of 'likeness in nature' and provide an account of relative fundamentality in terms of it and the notion of dependence. Finally, I discuss some puzzles that arise in Aristotle's Categories, to which the theory developed is applied.


Keywords


dependence, fundamentality, Aristotelian metaphysics

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/spe.2014.7.2.02

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Online ISSN: 1736-5899 | Print ISSN: 2228-110X